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I Comments
Hey! Universities! Leave Them Kids
Alone! :I Christian Legal Society v. Martinez




Imagine the following scenario: You are a student at the
unimaginatively-named Public University. You and a handful of other
students form a student organization on campus called "Students for
World Peace" with the purpose of advocating world peace. Your
organization applies for official recognition to take advantage of the
benefits provided by the school's registered student organization
program: use of classrooms to hold meetings; access to the email system
and bulletin boards; the ability to request modest funds; and the
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2012; B.A., Clemson University, 2006. I would like to thank my wife,
Kirsten, and three daughters for their constant love, patience, and support.
1. Roger Waters' classic lyrics were the inspiration for this title: "We don't need no
education. We don't need no thought control. No dark sarcasm in the classroom.
Teachers leave them kids alone. Hey! Teacher! Leave them kids alone." PINK FLOYD,
Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THE WALL (Columbia Records 1979).
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opportunity to dialog with other student groups. You willingly comply
with the university's regulations, including the university's
nondiscrimination policy. Citing its nondiscrimination policy, the
university imposes an "accept-all-comers" policy, requiring student
groups to accept any student for membership or leadership regardless of
the student's beliefs. Your organization is granted official recognition.
After a successful inaugural year, your organization holds elections
for the following academic year. To your dismay, a large handful of
students who oppose world peace have joined the group and are now
running for office. Unfortunately, because the university's accept-all-
comers policy prohibits your group from adopting a selective
membership policy, these peace-haters take over the organization. The
newly elected board's first order of business is to change the
organization's mission to impede world peace, believing that disharmony
is good for society and that world peace is unattainable.
While some members of the United States Supreme Court think that
such a "hostile takeover" of a student organization is unlikely,2 the Court
recently held in Christian Legal Society v. MartineZ3 ("CLS") that a
university may condition official recognition of a student organization on
the requirement that the organization accept all students who wish to
participate regardless of status or beliefs.4 As the scenario above
suggests, however, if the group is not permitted to engage in selective
membership, the Court's holding may have a significant impact on the
ability of a student group to communicate its mission and effectuate its
goals.5 CLS is the latest Supreme Court case to consider university
students' First Amendment rights in connection with a public
university's ability to condition access to a student-group forum. 6 Many
2. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2992 (2010) (asserting that
the Christian Legal Society's contention that "if organizations must open their arms to
all . . . saboteurs will infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and message . . . strikes us
as more hypothetical than real").
3. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
4. Id. at 2978.
5. While many of the cases discussed in this Comment concern the rights of
religious student groups, the primary focus is on the student groups' free speech and
expressive association rights and not their free exercise rights. Although a free exercise
discussion is relevant and beneficial, it is beyond the scope of this Comment. Thus, the
arguments made in this Comment are generally applicable to all student groups, whether
religious, political, or philosophical, while keeping in mind that religious speech and
association are key components of the discussion. In fact, in recent years religious
student groups appear to be bearing the brunt of discriminatory restrictions in both higher
education institutions and primary and secondary schools. See Richard F. Duncan,
Religious Civil Rights in Public High Schools: The Supreme Court Speaks on Equal
Access, 24 IND. L. REV. 111, 113-14 (1990).
6. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2987 (noting that three Supreme Court
cases specifically address this issue: Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), Widmar v.
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universities create student-group forums to promote speech and debate
on campus.7  Often, universities will impose restrictions on student
groups who wish to participate in the forum.1
Courts apply First Amendment public forum analysis9 to determine
the constitutionality of such restrictions.o The First Amendment's
protection of speech, association, and religion are widely debated
concerns on university campuses as they apply to students and student
organizations." The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. 12
Application of this constitutional provision to student-group forums
raises significant questions about the extent to which public universities
may restrict students' speech and associational rights on campus.
Courts have long recognized that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate."1 4
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
7. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access "for Religious
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 653 (1996) (noting the right of a student
group's equal access to a university open forum must be balanced with a university's
legitimate regulation of that forum). Paulsen astutely predicted that the "next generation
of equal access issues" would be "equal access subject to what terms and conditions?"
and noted one such condition for equal access would likely be a requirement of
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. Id. at 662-63.
8. See Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v.
Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 633 (2011).
9. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text (discussing the limited public
forum doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229-
30 (2000) (finding First Amendment protections applicable to university student speech
and applying forum analysis); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (applying forum analysis).
11. See Clay Calvert and Robert D. Richards, Interview and Commentary, Lighting a
Fire on College Campuses: An Inside Perspective on Free Speech, Public Policy &
Higher Education, 3 GEO. J.L. &PUB.POL'Y 205, 206 (2005).
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
13. A related concern is whether a university may prohibit religious practice on
campus or fund a religious student organization. Acknowledging that religious student
groups can argue a free exercise claim, this Comment will focus only on the free speech
and association claims of student groups.
14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so
circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. . . . The Constitution says that
2011] 165
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Courts also have recognized that the First Amendment permits
"reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully
restricted circumstances."15  Thus, courts have deferred broadly to the
discretion of universities in matters unique to the educational
environment.16 However, the question remains: when is a university
permitted to restrict students' First Amendment rights? According to the
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 67% of colleges
unconstitutionally restrict student speech.17  This figure is astonishing
when one considers the notion that "the vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools."1 In fact, courts have consistently acknowledged
that the college classroom deserves significant First Amendment
protections because the classroom is "peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas."' 19 However, this principle, that student speech must be afforded
First Amendment protection as an essential element of the exchange of
ideas on a university campus, seems to have slipped past the attention of
the Supreme Court's majority in CLS. 20
The Supreme Court now permits a university to require student
groups to accept-all-comers as a condition for access to a student-group
forum. 2 1 Because a university's policy prohibiting selective membership
Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means
what it says.").
15. Id.
16. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) ("A university's mission is
education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to
impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus
and facilities.").
17. FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., SPOTLIGHT ON SPEECH CODES 2010 6
(2011), http://thefire.org/public/pdfs/312bde37d07b9l3b47b63e275a5713f4.pdfdirect
(last visited July 16, 2011).
18. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960)).
19. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)); see also Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using
Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive
Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481 (2005) (noting the "essential purpose" of public universities
is to "inspire the exchange of new and challenging ideas," which is precisely what the
"Framers had in mind" when adopting the First Amendment's protection of free speech).
20. Adam Goldstein, Supreme Court's CLS Decision Sucker-Punches First
Amendment, THE HUFFINGTON PoST (June 29, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/adam-goldstein/supreme-courts-cls-decisi-b628329.html (noting the Court's
decision "helps no one to assert that public colleges can limit the constitutional rights of
students whenever they can rephrase their desire to exclude viewpoints as a desire to
include individuals").
21. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2978 (2010) (upholding
university's "accept-all-comers" policy).
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hinders student speech,2 2 student groups and free speech advocates must
consider extrajudicial measures to protect students' First Amendment
interests. Such a solution may be found in the Equal Access Act,23 which
protects a student organization's right to access a student-group forum in
public secondary schools.24 Either Congress or a state legislature could
enact legislation that would limit the ability of a public university to
restrict access to its student-group forum. Such legislation could be
drafted in a manner that both supports a university's educational goals
and protects students' First Amendment rights.
This Comment will argue that the CLS decision diverges from prior
Supreme Court precedents and disregards fundamental First Amendment
principles, which will impact the speech and association rights of student
organizations. Part II will survey Supreme Court precedents regarding
the permissible scope of a university's regulation of access to a student-
group forum. Part III will analyze CLS, contrasting the majority and
dissenting opinions against the framework of the Court's prior student
equal access cases. Part IV will assess the impact that CLS may have on
the First Amendment rights of students in a student-group forum.
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a proposal to adopt legislation
that protects the equal access of student groups to a university student-
group forum and preserves their free speech and association rights.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue presented to the Court in CLS was whether a public law
school may "condition its official recognition of a student group-and
the attendant use of school funds and facilities-on the organization's
agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all
students." 25 Justice Ginsburg cited three prior decisions that provide the
legal framework for deciding cases involving access to a school-
26 .27
sponsored forum: Healy v. James, Widmar v. Vincent, and
Rosenberger v. Rector.2 8 Taken together, these cases stand for the
principle that a public university may not deny "student organizations
22. See infra Part IV.B (arguing selective membership is an integral part of a student
organization's ability to thrive on a university campus and invoking principles of First
Amendment associational freedom).
23. Equal Access Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2006).
24. See id. The Act prohibits a public secondary school from restricting a "limited
open forum" on the basis of "religious, political, philosophical, or other speech content."
Id.
25. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
26. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
27. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
28. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
2011) I167
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access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints." 29
Justice Ginsburg attempted to articulate how the majority's opinion in
CLS is consistent with these prior decisions. 3 0 However, a close look at
Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger suggests a very different outcome than
that reached by the majority in CLS.
A. Healy
In Healy v. James, Central Connecticut State College refused to
recognize a student chapter of Students for a Democratic Society on the
basis that "the organization's philosophy was antithetical to the school's
policies."31  The Court's key concern was how to apply its First
Amendment jurisprudence to student speech and association rights on a
university campus. 32 It concluded that students have a First Amendment
right of free association and that a public university has a heavy burden
to justify any restriction of that right.33
The Court's rationale in Healy is vital to understanding how First
Amendment principles protect student groups' speech and associational
rights in a student-group forum. The Court first noted that public
universities are not "enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment." 34  This principle, however, must be balanced with an
understanding of the special nature of the educational environment.3 5
Courts must give wide latitude to school officials to maintain order and
make important pedagogical decisions.36 This "acknowledged need for
order" notwithstanding,3 7 courts must protect First Amendment rights on
university campuses, including the "right of individuals to associate to
further their personal beliefs." In Healy, the Court recognized that
students' free speech is an integral part of a university's purpose.39 This
idea of granting students broad speech and association rights is premised
29. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
30. Id. at 2987-88.
31. Healy, 408 U.S. at 172.
32. See id. at 171.
33. Id. at 184-85 ("While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption
on the campus ... a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action.").
34. Id. at 180 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
35. Id. at 184.
36. Id. at 180.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 180-81 ("[T]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools." (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
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on the notion that "[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'40
Recognizing that the First Amendment extends to students at a
university, the Court balanced the associational interests of students with
the university's responsibilities in light of its educational mission. ' The
Court explained that a university's refusal to recognize a student
organization was a serious abridgment of students' associational rights.42
Noting that the vitality of a student organization depends on the ability to
communicate with other students,43 the Court emphasized that the
consequences of nonrecognition were significant.4 Acknowledging the
fundamental importance of student groups' access to university facilities
and communication channels, the Court imposed a heavy burden on a
university's ability to deny recognition to student groups.4 5
Essential to a university's ability to deny recognition is an
understanding of the university's educational mission and interest in
preventing campus disruption.46 Neither a university's disapproval of a
student group's affiliation with an "unpopular organization""7 nor the
belief that a student group's philosophy is "abhorrent" are grounds for
the university to restrict speech or association rights.48  On the other
hand, a university is permitted to deny recognition based on evidence
that an organization's activities will be disruptive to the educational
environment. 4 9 In sum, the Court in Healy concluded that university
students have a First Amendment right of association, which the
university may abridge only under a heavy burden of demonstrating why
50nonrecognition serves a legitimate state interest.
40. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 386 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
41. Id. at 195-96.
42. Id. at 181.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 181-82 ("[Tlhe organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give
and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of
access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty
members, and other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.").
45. Id. at 184.
46. See id.; see also Mark J. Fiore, Note, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas
The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1915
(2002) (discussing the balance between student free speech rights and a university's right
to prevent disruption).
47. Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88.
48. Id. at 188-89.
49. See id. at 189, 193 (noting that time, place, and manner restrictions are likewise
permissible, including a requirement "that a group seeking official recognition affirm in
advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law").
50. See id. at 181, 184.
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B. Widmar
Justice Ginsburg also cited Widmar v. Vincent in framing the
Court's student-group forum analysis.5 2 In Widmar, the Court
considered whether a public university may deny access to its facilities
on the basis that the student group used the facilities for religious
discussion.5 3  The University of Missouri barred a registered student
group, formed to advance a religious cause, from meeting in campus
facilities.54 The university cited its policy prohibiting the use of its
facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."" The
Court held that, because the university had created a student-group
forum, it could not deny the student group access to campus facilities.56
The university's denial of access was an "impermissible content-based
exclusion of religious speech."57 The university, according to the Court,
was "unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards."58
Citing its analysis in Healy,59 the Court noted that the university
must provide appropriate justification for excluding any group because
the university had created a forum open to all student groups. 60 The
Court concluded that the University of Missouri's justification for
exclusion-that the student group violated the campus policy prohibiting
the use of university facilities for religious purposes-was
unconstitutional. 6 1 This conclusion marks an important distinction
between Healy and Widmar: the speech in Widmar was religious, which
raised First Amendment Establishment Clause concerns, while the
speech in Healy was political, which implicated free speech and
association concerns.62 Applying the Lemon Test, the Court quickly
dispensed with those concerns and concluded that an equal access policy
51. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
52. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
53. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
54. See id. at 265.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 277.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 267 n.5 ("We .. . have held that students enjoy First Amendment rights
of speech and association on the campus, and that the 'denial [to particular groups] of use
of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes' must be subjected to the
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint." (citing Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 181, 184 (1972))).
60. Id. at 267.
61. Id. at 277.
62. Id. at 268-69.
63. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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for religious student groups does not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Lemon Test" is a three-prong analysis used to determine whether a
law implicates the Establishment Clause. The reviewing court considers
(1) whether the statute has a secular purpose, (2) whether the principle
effects of the statute advance or inhibit religion, and (3) whether the
statute fosters an excessive entanglement in religion.
The Court's application of the Lemon Test in Widmar is instructive.
In the Court's view, the university improperly concluded that permitting
religious speech or worship in the forum would be, in effect, the state
advancing religion. The Court explained that the benefits resulting
from a religious group's inclusion in a student speech forum are merely
incidental for two important reasons.6 First, "an open forum in a public
university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval" on the
group or its beliefs. Second, "the forum is available to a broad class of
nonreligious as well as religious speakers." 70 These two justifications led
the Court to conclude that the protection of First Amendment speech and
association rights, rather than free exercise were the basis for its decision
in Widmar." Thus, a university may not restrict the speech and
association rights of a religious student group merely because a
university disagrees with the group's religious exercise or viewpoint.72
Recognizing that a university's creation of a student-group forum does
not require the school to cast its imprimatur on a student group's beliefs
or activities is an important conclusion disregarded by the CLS majority.
C. Rosenberger
The third case Justice Ginsburg cited in developing the Court's
forum analysis was Rosenberger v. Rector.7 3  In Rosenberger, the
University of Virginia refused to fund a student group's publication of a
64. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
65. For a thorough discussion and criticism of the Lemon Test, see Thomas C.
Marks, Jr. and Michael Bertolini, Lemon is a Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. Publ. L. 1 (1997).
66. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
67. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273.
68. Id. at 274.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 273 n.13.
72. See Richard A. Epstein, A Big Year for the First Amendment: Church and State
at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
105, 128 (2010) (discussing applicability of Widmar to CLS and noting "[t]here seems to
be no meaningful distinction between the cases").
73. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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magazine which promoted a religious viewpoint. 74  The university
determined that publication of the magazine was a religious activity. 75 A
university policy, however, prohibited the funding of religious
activities. 6 Applying the limited public forum doctrine,n the Court held
that the university's refusal to fund a religious group's newsletter
because of its religious content was blatant viewpoint discrimination.
The Court noted that "[v]ital First Amendment speech principles are
at stake" and identified two dangers inherent in the university's policy.79
First is the danger to liberty that results from allowing a governmental
entity to review print materials for religious content and then flagging
that speech as inappropriate.o Second is the danger to speech "from the
chilling of individual thought and expression."81 The Court noted that
this chilling effect on speech is particularly dangerous in higher
education "where the State acts against a background and tradition of
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and
philosophic tradition."82 Thus, the Court insisted, protecting student
speech on a university campus is essential to the intellectual success of
students and to the nation as a whole.83
Against the legal backdrop of Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, the
Court decided CLS. 84 The majority and dissenting opinions, however,
apply this legal and historical background in vastly different manners.8 5
III. CHRISTIANLEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ: AN ANALYSIS
CLS is a case about equal access to a student-group forum.8 6 The
Court considered whether a public university may impose an "accept-all-
74. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 825. The university defined religious activity as "any activity that
'primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality."' Id.
77. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text (discussing the limited public
forum doctrine).
78. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837.




83. Id. at 836 (noting that "[t]he quality and creative power of student intellectual
life . . . remains a vital measure of a school's influence" and that university regulations
that disparage particular viewpoints of students risk "the suppression of free speech and
creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and
university campuses").
84. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
85. See id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting in complete opposition to the
majority that under the framework of cases cited by the majority, "Hastings' refusal to
register CLS pursuant to its Nondiscrimination Policy plainly fails").
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comers" policy as a condition to official recognition and access to the
university's student-group forum and its attendant benefits.87 An accept-
all-comers policy requires a student organization to accept any student
wishing to apply for membership or leadership in the organization
regardless of that student's status or beliefs. Applying the limited
public forum doctrine, 89 the Court's majority concluded that an all-
comers policy is a constitutionally permissible condition on access to a
university's student-group forum.90
A. Setting the Stage: The Facts
Hastings College of Law is part of the University of California
public-school system.91 Hastings encourages its students to form student
organizations to enhance their educational experiences.92 Like many
other universities, Hastings implemented a registered student
organization ("RSO") program to facilitate the creation and management
of its student organizations.93  Official recognition under the RSO
program provides student groups with a number of benefits: (1) financial
assistance from the university through the mandatory student activity fee;
(2) channels of communication-such as the opportunity to publish
school-wide announcements, use of designated bulletin boards for
advertising, and access to the school email system; (3) participation in
the annual Student Organizations Fair; (4) use of school facilities for
meetings; and (5) use of Hastings' logo and name. 94  To qualify for
official recognition and its attendant benefits, RSOs must comply with
certain university regulations, including Hastings' Nondiscrimination
Policy.95 As interpreted by Hastings, the Nondiscrimination Policy
86. Id. at 2984 (majority opinion) ("This opinion... considers... whether
conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers
policy violates the Constitution.").
87. Id. at 2978-79.
88. Id. at 2995.
89. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text (discussing the limited public
forum doctrine).
90. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2978-79.
94. Id. at 2979.
95. Id. The parties and the Justices on the Court widely disagreed over what the
Nondiscrimination Policy actually said. Compare id. at 2982 (majority opinion) (noting
"we must resolve a preliminary issue: CLS urges us to review the Nondiscrimination
Policy as written ... and not as a requirement that all RSOs accept all corners"), with id.
at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority conveniently chose the iteration of the
policy that would "free[] the Court from the difficult task of defending the
constitutionality" of the policy). Apparently, a written nondiscrimination policy and a
1732011]
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requires student organizations to "accept all comers," meaning that
student organizations may not restrict their membership or their
leadership on the basis of status or belief.9 6
In 2004, a group of students at Hastings formed the Christian Legal
Society ("Society"), a student chapter affiliated with the national
Christian Legal Society. 9 7 The Society is an "association of lawyers, law
students, law professors, and judges who profess faith in Jesus Christ"
and whose mission is to "maintain a vibrant Christian law fellowship" at
Hastings to help its members exemplify the Christian faith.98  The
Society invites all students at Hastings to participate in the group's
meetings and activities.99 Nonmembers, however, may not vote or
participate in the leadership of the group.100 To become a voting member
or to hold office in the Society, a student "must affirm a commitment to
the group's foundational principles by signing a Statement of Faith."'o
The Society applied for RSO status and submitted its constitution
and bylaws to the Office of Student Services for review.102  After
reviewing the documents, Hastings refused to grant official recognition
to the Society, concluding that the organization's constitution violated
Hastings' Nondiscrimination Policy on the basis of religion and sexual
orientation.103  Specifically, Hastings required the Society to open its
membership to all students, forbidding the religious organization to limit
voting membership on the basis of belief in the group's core values.10 4
Alternatively, Hastings said that the Society could continue to operate
without official recognition, but Hastings would withhold RSO
benefits. 105
verbal incantation of that policy dually existed. The majority resolved the discrepancy by
pointing to a joint stipulation between the parties that limited the issue to the all-comers
requirement of the nondiscrimination policy. See id. at 2984.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2980.
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2091 at *15.
99. See id. at *15 (explaining that the Christian Legal Society "wants persons who
are not CLS members to come, listen, and participate in hopes they will be persuaded to
agree with CLS's religious viewpoints").
100. Seeid.at*16.
101. Id. The Statement of Faith reflects orthodox Christian tenets including sexual
abstinence outside of the traditional marriage between a man and a woman. Id.
102. See id. at *18.
103. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010). The
Statement of Faith articulated the belief that "sexual activity should not occur outside of
marriage between a man and a woman." Id. Thus, the Society required gay and lesbian
students to repent of their homosexual conduct before becoming a member or officer of
the Society. Id.
104. See id. at 2980-81.
105. See id. at 2981.
174 [Vol. 116:1
HEY! UNIVERSITIES! LEAVE THEM KIDS ALONE!
The Society refused to change its bylaws to conform to Hastings'
Nondiscrimination Policy.106 The Society filed suit in federal court
against Hastings officials, alleging that Hastings violated the Society's
First Amendment rights of free speech, expressive association, and free
exercise of religion.'0 7 The District Court granted summary judgment for
Hastings finding that the enforcement of its Nondiscrimination Policy
did not violate the student's constitutional rights. 08  Applying limited
public forum analysis to the free speech claim, the District Court found
that Hastings' Nondiscrimination Policy was viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.109 The District Court
also rejected the Society's expressive association claims finding the
Supreme Court's expressive association precedents inapplicable."l0 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, citing a stipulation
between the parties,"' and held that Hastings' conditions on recognition
were viewpoint-neutral and reasonable." 2
B. Departing from Precedent: The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and
essentially adopted the District Court's reasoning." 3  The majority
opinion began with a statement of the rule developed by the Court in
Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger: "the First Amendment generally
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347,
at *17, 88 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2006).
109. Id. at *43-45.
110. Id.at*51.
111. The parties stipulated to the fact that "Hastings requires that registered student
organizations allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership
positions in the organization, regardless of [her] [sic] status or beliefs." Christian Legal
Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010) (quoting the parties' Joint Stipulation)
(emphasis in original). This stipulation was hotly debated at oral argument and between
the Court's majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions and played a key role in
narrowing the scope of the case. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A Fatal Stipulation,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2010, 11:35 pm), http://www.scotusblog.com. Interestingly, the
majority's holding that parties are bound to their factual stipulations seems to be one of
the key takeaway points of the case. See, e.g., Provident Fin., Inc. v. Strategic Energy,
L.L.C., 404 Fed. Appx. 835, 839 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez v. Compass Vision, Inc.,
No. 07cvl951, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 106161, at *8 n. 4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5,2010).
112. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, 319 Fed. App'x 645, 646 (9th Cir. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit astonishingly disposed of the case in a two sentence opinion: "The parties
stipulate that Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups-all
groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with
the mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore viewpoint neutral
and reasonable. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2008)." Id. at
645-46.
113. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
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precludes public universities from denying student organizations access
to school-sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints."ll 4
Nevertheless, "[b]rushing aside [this] inconvenient precedent,"" 5 the
Court concluded that Hastings' policy was a "reasonable, viewpoint-
neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum.""16
In order to determine whether Hastings had violated the Christian
Legal Society's free speech and free association rights, the Court
deliberated about which level of scrutiny it should apply." 7 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the Society relied on two separate lines of
precedent-one to support its free speech claim and the other to support
its free association claim." 8 The distinction between these two areas of
precedent is critical.
The first line of cases called for an application of the Court's forum
analysis.1 9  While the First Amendment provides broad protection
against the government regulation of speech, the Supreme Court has
recognized certain situations in which the government may restrict
speech conducted on propertyl20 in its care,121 creating three distinct
categories: a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, and a
limited public forum.12 2
A traditional public forum provides the broadest protection to
speech and includes such "quintessential public" places as a public street
114. See id.
115. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that in spite of the precedent cited by
the majority, "the Court arms public educational institutions with a handy weapon for
suppressing the speech of unpopular groups").
116. Id. at 2978 (majority opinion).
117. See id. at 2984.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. The Court has noted that the boundaries of property are not limited to physical
characteristics. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995). Thus, while a student organization forum does not fit the traditional
mold, the Court has consistently recognized its legitimacy. Id (noting that the
university's student forum was a forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or
geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable"); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (noting that the "traditional conceptions of territorial
boundaries are difficult to insist upon in an aged marked by revolutionary changes in
communications").
121. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
The Court has developed a three-step analysis for reviewing an alleged First Amendment
violation: (1) the court first considers whether the activity is protected under the First
Amendment; (2) the court then determines the nature of the forum at issue; (3) finally, the
court determines whether the restrictions imposed on the activity are appropriate to the
forum by applying the correct level of scrutiny. See Frantz v. Gress, 520 F. Supp. 2d
677, 681 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
122. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010); Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 817.
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or park.12 3 In a traditional public forum, courts apply strict scrutiny.124
Thus, to impose a content-based restriction, the government must
demonstrate a compelling state interest and show that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.125
A designated public forum arises where the government opens
nontraditional property for use as a place for speech or expressive
activity. 126  In a designated public forum, courts also apply strict
scrutiny.12 7 Thus, where the state designates property as a public forum,
any content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest, just as in a traditional public forum.128
A government entity establishes a limited public forum where it
opens property for a limited use by certain groups or dedicates the
property for the discussion of particular subjects.12 9  Courts apply a
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral standard to restrictions on speech in a
limited public forum.13 0 Under this standard, a governmental entity may
not exclude speech in a way that is unreasonable in light of the purpose
of the forum, and it may not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint.13 1
Relying on prior decisions, 132 the Court determined that Hastings'
RSO program was a limited public forum.133  Importantly, the Court
noted a university is not required to provide a forum for student
speech.134 However, once the university has opened the forum, it "must
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set."' 35  Once a university
creates a limited public forum, any restriction on access to the forum on
the basis of speech must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.136
123. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 817.
124. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
125. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
126. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
127. See Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
128. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981).
129. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11.
130. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
131. Id.
132. The cases the Court cited include Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392-93 (1993); and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
133. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
134. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
135. Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
136. See Christian Legal Soc y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.11.
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The second line of cases that the Society invoked was the Court's
expressive association cases.137  Restrictions on associational freedom
are subject to strict scrutiny and are permitted only if they serve a
compelling state interest.138 Implicit in the First Amendment is the right
of expressive association. 3 9 A corollary of the freedom of speech, the
right of expressive association permits people to join together to promote
a particular point of view.140  In creating an expressive association,
members of a group have a much stronger voice than they would if they
were speaking as individuals.141 Protecting the right of people to gather
together to advance a shared goal is essential to "preserving political and
cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression
by the majority." 4 2
The Court has asserted that this right of expressive association
permits an organization to create and apply selective membership
criteria. 143 Such membership criteria may even conflict with a state's
institutional nondiscrimination policies. 44  An expressive association
must be allowed to exclude from membership anyone whose presence
would affect the group's ability to express its viewpoints.145 Forced
137. See id. at 2985.
138. See id.
139. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W]e have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."); see also Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000).
140. David E. Bernstein, Expressive Association After Dale, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y
195 (2004) (noting that "[fjreedom of expression must consist of more than the right to
talk to oneself').
141. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that protecting an
"association's right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the
formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of
members is the definition of that voice").
142. Id. at 622.
143. See id. at 623 (noting that the freedom of association "plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate"). At the same time, the Supreme Court ruled that a state may
constitutionally prohibit invidious discrimination in places of public accommodation.
See id. at 624 (noting that a state may adopt laws aimed at "eliminating discrimination
and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services" because
such a law, if "unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state
interests of the highest order").
144. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000) ("[P]ublic or judicial
disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to
compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from
the organization's expressive message.").
145. See id.
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inclusion of an unwanted member who disagrees with a group's
viewpoint dilutes the group's message.14 6
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,14 7 the Supreme Court addressed
an expressive association's right to exclude.14 8 The Boy Scouts revoked
the membership of James Dale, a scout leader, after the organization
learned that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist.14 9 The Boy
Scouts believed that Dale's membership in the organization would
conflict with its view that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the
values it seeks to instill in its young members. 50 The Court held that the
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the
Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would violate the
Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association.' 5 ' The Court agreed
with the Boy Scouts that Dale's presence as a leader would force the
organization to convey a message that was inconsistent with its point of
view.' 5 2  The Court affirmed that an expressive association must be
allowed to preserve its message by applying selective membership
criteria.15 3 In order to restrict an organization's expressive association
rights, according to the Court, a state must overcome the heavy burden of
strict scrutiny.154
The majority in CLS conveniently sidestepped the holding in
Dale.' Contrary to the Society's argument that its free speech claim
and its expressive association claim should be analyzed separately, the
Court concluded that the Society's "expressive-association and free-
speech arguments merge [and it] therefore makes little sense to treat
146. See Bernstein, supra note 140, at 195 (arguing that given enough time the
"dissenting members forced upon an organization by the government could achieve
sufficient power to change the organization's values"); see also Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 633
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe formation of an expressive association is the creation
of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice."); Steffen N.
Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Autonomy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1639,
1667 (2001) ("If the government may co-opt . .. groups by exercising control over their
membership and leaders, their ability to raise their voice . . . will be lost.").
147. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.
148. See Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading
Between the Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 641, 642
(2002) (noting that Dale addresses two conflicting constitutional principles: free speech,
or the right to express one's message, and equality, or the right to be free from
discrimination).
149. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
150. Id. at 654.
151. Id.at659.
152. Id. at 653.
153. Id. at 648.
154. Id. at 657-58.
155. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010).
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CLS's speech and association claims as discrete."' 5 6 Having decided that
the two claims merged, the Court made a critical choice to apply the less-
restrictive limited public forum analysis. 157 If the Court had adopted its
expressive association analysis and applied strict scrutiny when deciding
CLS, Hastings would have had to demonstrate that its accept-all-comers
policy served a compelling state interest that was unrelated to the
suppression of ideas and that could not be achieved through less
restrictive means. 11 Instead, the Court needed only to consider whether
the policy was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
The Court advanced three reasons for its decision to merge the
claims and dismiss strict scrutiny analysis.15' First, the Court noted that
the speech and association rights were closely linked and that it would be
"anomalous" for one to survive constitutional scrutiny but not the
other.160  Determining that the expressive association claim played a
secondary role in support of the free speech claim, the Court concluded
the free speech analysis should control.'61 Second, the Court believed
that applying the strict scrutiny analysis would interfere with the
university's right to define the characteristics of its student-group
forum.162  Third, the Court argued that the Society sought a "state
subsidy" and faced only "indirect pressure to modify its membership
policies." 63  Because the group could continue to exist without the
"subsidy" according to the Court, the university was not compelling the
group to include unwanted members.164 The Court concluded that the
Society's expressive association claim was distinguishable from the
Court's expressive association precedents.165  The Court's decision to
merge the claims and apply public forum analysis allowed the Court to
156. Id. at 2985.
157. Id. at 2986 (concluding that the "limited-public-forum precedents adequately
respect both CLS's speech and expressive-association rights, and fairly balance those
rights against Hastings' interests as property owner and educational institution").
158. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.




163. Id at 2986. See generally, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association
and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1919 (2006) (arguing the government has
no duty to subsidize expressive associations that have discriminatory membership criteria
and explaining that excluding groups for their expressive association decisions is
different from excluding groups for their viewpoint). The five-member majority in CLS
fulfilled Volokh's prediction that "[w]hen a subsidy case arises, it seems unlikely that
discriminating expressive associations will find the five votes they need to prevail." Id.
at 1968.
164. Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
165. Id.
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ignore the Society's free association claim and sidestep the more difficult
strict scrutiny test.' 6
Deciding that the appropriate framework for review was limited
public forum analysis,16 7 the Court applied the two-part test to determine
whether a university's restriction of speech in a limited public forum is
constitutionally permissible: (1) whether the restriction was reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum; and (2) whether the
restriction was viewpoint neutral.168  Accepting Hastings' numerous
justifications for the policy, the Court concluded that the policy was
reasonable.169 First, Hastings' reasoned that the all-comers policy served
the goal of providing leadership, educational, and social opportunities for
all students within the RSO forum.170 Second, the Court agreed that the
all-comers policy helped Hastings police its Nondiscrimination Policy
without requiring the university to inquire into an organization's motives
for membership restrictions.' 7' Third, the Court accepted Hastings' view
that the all-comers policy brought together individuals with diverse
backgrounds and beliefs and promoted tolerance and cooperation among
students.17 2 Finally, the Court agreed that the all-comers policy advanced
a state-law goal of preventing discrimination. 7 1
The Court then astonishingly concluded that the reasonableness of
the all-comers policy was "all the more creditworthy" because alternative
avenues of communication were available off campus for the
organization to exercise its First Amendment rights.' 7 4 The Court noted
that the Society could take advantage of email, websites, and hosts like
MySpace, Google, and Yahoo! message groups.'7 ' The Court further
noted that Hastings' regulation of speech only needed to be reasonable,
not the most reasonable option.176
166. The ability of the Court to disguise one constitutional right under the form of
another constitutional right in order to escape the application of a stricter level of scrutiny
raises some serious concerns. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of
Silence: The Equal Status ofReligious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,
45 (1986) (arguing that it "makes little sense to apply the compelling interest test to a
category of cases and then let the government opt out of the category at will").
167. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2987.
168. Id at 2988.
169. Id at 2991.
170. Id. at 2989.
171. Id. at 2990.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2991.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 874 (7th Cir.
2006) (Wood, J., dissenting)).
176. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2992.
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Having concluded that the all-comers policy was reasonable, the
Court then considered whether the policy was viewpoint neutral. 17 7 The
Court reasoned that it was "hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral
policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers" and
thus the all-comers policy was "textbook viewpoint neutral."178
Finding that Hastings' all-comers policy was constitutional, the
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling.179 The Court remanded the
case to determine whether the Society had preserved the argument that
Hastings selectively applied the all-comers policy as a matter of
pretext.180 On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the Society had not
raised a pretext argument the first time around and thus the issue was not
preserved for appeal. 81
The majority opinion is problematic for a number of reasons.182
Most importantly for this Comment, in merging the expressive
association and speech claims, the Court limited the ability of student
organizations to bring expressive association claims.183  The Court's
opinion in CLS seems to indicate that as long as a university can
demonstrate that its restriction on speech is viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the student-group forum, then students' expressive
association claims are irrelevant. 184
The majority's opinion begs the question of whether the Court
would have come to a different conclusion if the Christian Legal Society
had argued only that its expressive association rights had been violated
and not asserted a free speech claim. Such a scenario would be more
analogous to Healy, where the Court held that the university had a
"heavy burden" of demonstrating a compelling state interest in order to
infringe on a student group's expressive association rights. 8 1 Under this
scenario, the Court would likely have construed the argument as a free
speech argument in light of the public forum doctrine and arrived at the
same conclusion that it ultimately did.
177. Id. at 2993.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2995.
180. Id.
181. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010).
182. Some commentators have suggested that the CLS decision will have significant
implications beyond higher education. See, e.g., William E. Thro and Charles J. Russo, A
Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,
261 ED. LAW REP. 473, 481 (2010) ("[N]othing in the Opinion of the Court suggests that
the result is limited to higher education. Rather, the decision has broad implications for
constitutional law."). However, this Comment will address only those implications that
bear on the equal access rights of student groups at universities.
183. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
184. Id. at 2985-86.
185. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-84 (1972).
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The Court's justifications for merging the free speech and
association claims are disconcerting for another reason as well.' 86 The
Court set a very low threshold for finding that the government is
"dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition."187
The Court repeatedly denied that Hastings was compelling the
membership of unwanted individuals in an expressive association,
arguing that the student groups could continue to exist without
complying with the policy-only without the benefits derived from
recognition.188 Such an assumption, however, is a figment of reality. As
Justice Alito pointed out, university students consider the campus their
world. 18 9  Many student groups cannot survive without the benefits
conferred by an RSO program.190 This point raises the issue of how
important access to an RSO program is for the vitality of a student group.
Justice Alito sought to answer this question in his dissenting opinion in
CLS.191
186. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
187. Id.; see also Robert Luther III, Marketplace of Ideas 2.0: Excluding Viewpoints
to Include Individuals, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 673, 694-95 (2011).
188. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986, 2991.
189. Id. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Scalia,
and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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IV. A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE: JUSTICE ALITO'S DISSENTING
OPINION
Writing for the dissenters in CLS, Justice Alito expressed his belief
that the Court's decision was "a serious setback for freedom of
expression."' 92  Has the Court turned a corner in its protection of
university students' speech and association rights? CLS may be
indicative of a shift in current jurisprudence to expand a university's
ability to limit student speech and association rights. 193 Historically, the
Court has sided with student groups, consistently finding that the
contested university regulation of speech was unconstitutional.19 4
Conversely, in CLS the Court upheld a university's regulation of speech
as constitutionally permissible, which resulted in a denial of access to the
university's student-group forum.19 5  Is the reason for the different
outcomes merely because in Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, the
university regulations were not reasonable or viewpoint-neutral, while in
CLS, the regulations were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral? Or did
public policy concerns play a role causing the Court's fiercely-divided
decision? 9 6
While the relevant policy considerations are beyond the scope of
this Comment,19 7 the potential consequences of the Court's decision are
not insignificant. Alito's dissent raises some salient points about the far-
reaching impact of the Court's CLS decision.198 Broadly speaking, CLS
192. Id. at 3020.
193. See Goldstein supra note 20 (arguing that the Court's rationale may result in
"doing more violence to student expression rights than any decision" in recent years).
194. See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding university failed to
meet its heavy burden under the First Amendment to deny recognition of student
organization where students were willing to abide by reasonable campus rules and
regulations); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding university's exclusionary
policy violated constitutional norms and finding university's interest in achieving
separation of church and state was not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based
discrimination against religious speech of student group); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding university's denial of funds for
religious student group's newsletter violated First Amendment).
195. See Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2995.
196. Alito began his dissent with the assertion that the majority's decision rested on a
principle far different from the Court's historical free speech jurisprudence: "no freedom
for expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's
institutions of higher learning." Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
197. For example, some see the Court's decision as championing LGBT rights. See
Michael Jones, The U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 Gay Rights Split, CHANGE.ORG (June 28,
2010), http://news.change.org/stories/the-us-supreme-courts-5-4-gay-rights-split (noting
that LGBT groups were "celebrating the decision . .. [because] the current Supreme
Court [was] throwing [its] weight behind the push for LGBT equality").
198. Justice Alito argued extensively that the Court's focus on the accept-all-comers
policy was misplaced. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 3019. Alito argued that
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will likely impact the ability of student groups that wish to maintain a
core group of individuals committed to a common belief to participate
fully in the give-and-take of a university student-group forum.19 9
While Justice Alito's dissent raises many criticisms about the
majority's opinion, 200 this comment will address two key issues: (1) the
cost of nonrecognition, 2 0 ' and (2) the value of permitting selective
membership. 202
A. The Cost ofNonrecognition
Justice Alito opined that the Court's decision will result in the
marginalization of unpopular student groups.2 03 Prior to CLS, the Court
consistently held that denial of recognition and access to a forum would
be detrimental to a student group.204 The majority considered it
"significant" that the Society had "other available avenues . . . to
exercise" its First Amendment rights outside of Hastings' student-group
forum.2 05 However, this assertion contradicts the concept that a student-
group forum provides both the means and protection to student groups
wishing to exercise First Amendment rights on campus. Recognizing the
majority's attempt to diminish the effects of nonrecognition, Justice Alito
noted that "[t]his Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of
unlawful discrimination with the observation that the effects of the
discrimination were really not so bad." 20 6  Attempting to correct the
majority's mischaracterization of the effects of nonrecognition, Justice
Alito pointed to the Court's treatment of nonrecognition in Healy.207 The
majority's assertion that the group could have existed outside of the RSO
program defies the very purpose for which student-group forums are
created: to provide a platform and the means by which students can form
groups and engage in thought and discussion on the university campus.
the Court should have considered Hastings inconsistent application of its written
Nondiscrimination Policy instead. Id. While this argument is an important criticism of
the majority opinion, an analysis of that argument is beyond the scope of this Comment.
199. See Thro, supra note 182, at 494.
200. For example, Justice Alito argued that the accept-all-comers policy was neither
viewpoint-neutral nor reasonable. See Christian Legal Soc 'y, 130 S. Ct. at 3006-07
(Alito, J., dissenting).
201. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 3006-07 (Alito, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 3014.
203. See id. at 3019.
204. See supra Part II (discussing Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger).
205. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2991.
206. See id. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 3007 (noting that a comparison of CLS and Healy demonstrates "how
far the Court has strayed"); see supra Part II.A (discussing Healy).
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTIVE MEMBERSHIP
Likewise, permitting university student groups to employ selective
membership criteria is important to the vitality of a student-group forum.
The Court's majority reasoned that prohibiting selective membership
criteria through the application of an accept-all-comers policy is a
legitimate application of a university's nondiscrimination policy.2 0 8
However, the Court artfully sidestepped the issue of whether a university
may restrict First Amendment speech that violates its nondiscrimination
policy.20 9 The Court's holding permits a university to require student
organizations to accept-all-comers, but it leaves open the question of
how far a university may go in applying its nondiscrimination policy at
the expense of First Amendment rights.210 In fact, the majority and the
dissent disagreed over which policy was even at issue. 2 1 1 In the end, the
majority settled on the all-comers policy, leaving unsettled the issues
about the nondiscrimination policy for another day.2 12 However, even a
cursory reading of the majority's opinion reveals favorable support for a
university's right to restrict speech based on the enforcement of a
nondiscrimination policy as long as the policy is reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.
The Court's seeming approval of subjugating First Amendment
rights to a nondiscrimination policy raises some concerns. If a university
applies a nondiscrimination policy that prohibits discrimination only on
the basis of race, gender, and religion, could the university permit a
political group to restrict membership to students who subscribe to the
group's particular political ideology while forbidding a religious group
from restricting membership to students who believe in its particular
religious beliefs? Under the majority's rationale in CLS, the answer to
this question appears to be yes. Justice Ginsburg seemed very
comfortable with the fact that Hastings interpreted its nondiscrimination
policy to mean that a group must "accept-all-comers."213 The Court
reasoned that all groups were affected in the same way, thus the policy
208. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990-91 (2010).
209. See Richard A. Epstein, So Much for Religious Liberty, FORBES.COM (June 28,
2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/28/religion-speech-legal-supreme-
court-opinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html.
210. See id.
211. Compare, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (majority opinion)
(explaining that the opinion "considers only whether conditioning access to a student-
organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the Constitution"),
with id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority wrongly based its
analysis "on the proposition that the relevant Hastings' policy is the so-called accept-all-
comers policy").
212. Id. at 2984.
213. Id. at 2988-89.
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was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.2 14 But, Hastings asserted that the
accept-all-comers policy applied to all student groups. However, if
Hastings applied its accept-all-comers policy only to certain groups, as
defined by the nondiscrimination policy, it seems that the Court still
would have upheld the policy as constitutionally permissible because the
policy would have been applied consistently as to that type of group-for
example all religious groups would be required to accept all students.
Thus, a university could apply its nondiscrimination policy in a way that
affects certain student groups-such as religious groups-different from
other groups-such as political groups-yet still comply with the Court's
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral standard.2 15
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Truth v. Kent School District2 16
21
illustrates the willingness of courts to adopt such a conclusion. 1 A
group of students formed a religious group, Truth, at a public high school
and applied for recognition and funding from the Kent School District.2 18
The District invoked its nondiscrimination policy, claiming the policy
prohibited recognition of student organizations that discriminate on
certain grounds including religion. 2 19  When the District denied
recognition because Truth restricted its membership to Christians only,
the group sued the District alleging the policy violated the students' First
Amendment rights.22 0 Truth argued that the District did not apply its
nondiscrimination policy to other student groups and permitted those
211
groups to restrict membership on grounds other than religion.
According to the court, the District's nondiscrimination policy
applied to discrimination on the basis of religion but not to
discrimination on the basis of political belief.2 22 Thus, the District could
prohibit religious groups from excluding non-Christians from
membership pursuant to the nondiscrimination policy while allowing
other groups, such as EarthCorps and the Gay-Straight Alliance, to
restrict its membership to students who support a specific political
viewpoint.22 3 The ability of a school district or university to apply its
nondiscrimination policy in such a manner suggests school
214. Id. at 2992-94.
215. See Luther supra note 187, at 694-95 (noting that CLS will permit policy-makers
and universities to "rephrase their desire to exclude viewpoints as a desire to include
individuals") (quoting Goldstein supra note 20).
216. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2009).
217. Id. at 648.
218. Id. at 637.
219. Id. at 639.
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administrators may apply nondiscrimination policies to weed out
unpopular student organizations.224 It also suggests that universities and
school districts recognize the value of selective membership, because
administrators seem willing to permit politically correct groups to
condition group membership. 2 25
Although courts have agreed that a university has an interest in
enforcing a nondiscrimination policy through the use of an all-comers
policy, key counterarguments identify the importance of permitting
student groups to impose selective membership criteria.226 One obvious
reason to allow student groups to exercise selective membership is the
threat of a hostile takeover like the scenario at the beginning of this
Comment.227  Most would agree with Justice Ginsburg that such a
proposition is "more hypothetical than real."228 In fact, the Society
provided no evidence that saboteurs were waiting in the shadows to
"infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and message." 2 2 9 Nonetheless,
ensuring that a student group's rights are secure and free from the threat
of infringement-or hostile takeover-is important.230 Simply put, it is
not the place of the judiciary to deny protection of a constitutional right
merely because the court believes the threat to that right is not significant
or even probable.2 31
The slim likelihood of a hostile takeover notwithstanding,
expressive identity is important to protect against the more subtle forms
of interference with a group's speech and associational activities. 23 2 For
an expressive association, deciding who can speak will determine the
group's message.233 As Justice Alito noted, a student group's First
224. See Richard A. Epstein, A Big Year for the First Amendment: Church and State
at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
105, 129 (2010) (noting that Hastings' application of its Nondiscrimination Policy "in
such a haphazard manner" suggests the University intends "to prevent organizations like
CLS from using facilities because they discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation"
and thus "the all-comers policy becomes a pretext for a much more focused
discriminatory activity").
225. See Joan W. Howarth, Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Right of Student
Groups, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 889, 892 (2009) ("Few of us would spend much energy
defending the right of a person who eats bacon for breakfast, burgers for lunch, and steak
for dinner to become the President of the Vegetarian Society.").
226. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 858 (2d Cir. 1996).
227. See supra Part I.
228. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2992 (2010).
229. Id.
230. See Howarth supra note 225, at 894-95 (noting the critical importance of First
Amendment protections to ensure group autonomy and to foster "identity-forming, idea-
forming entities").
231. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
232. See id. at 3014.
233. See id.
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Amendment rights are "burdened by the 'forced inclusion' of members
whose presence would 'affec[t] in a significant way the group's ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints."'
234
V. RECOMMENDATION: A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Now that the Supreme Court has held that a university may require
student groups to accept-all-comers as a condition of access to a student-
group forum, what steps may be taken to protect the endangered speech
and association rights of student groups? Admittedly, the Court's
holding is narrow in that it provides discretion to universities to enact an
accept-all-comers policy, but such a policy is not required.235 Thus, a
university is free to allow student groups to engage in selective
membership. However, now that the Court has approved a university
policy that prohibits selective membership in student organizations, other
universities will likely enact policies similar to Hastings' all-comers
236policy in an effort to mitigate perceived discrimination or inequalities.
Student groups and free speech advocates uncomfortable with the
Court's holding should consider extrajudicial measures. One way to
ensure that student groups are protected from an all-comers policy is
through carefully drafted legislation.
A state legislature or the United States Congress could enact a
statute that provides broad protection to students' free speech and
expressive association rights in a university's student-group forum.
Courts have upheld legislation aimed at providing students with broad
speech and association rights.237
For example, in Moore v. Watson,238 a federal court upheld an
Illinois statute2 3 9 that created a statutory public forum for student speech.
The statute designated "[a]ll campus media produced primarily by
students at a State-sponsored institution of higher learning" as a public
forum for student expression.240 The court in Moore noted that the
Illinois legislature created the statute as a direct response to the Seventh
234. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000)). See
Howarth supra note 225, at 926-28 (discussing the need for schools and student groups to
have expressive identities).
235. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 (2010).
236. See, e.g., Badger Catholic v. Walsh, Nos. 09-1102, 09-1112, 2010 WL 3419886
(7th Cir. Sept. 1, 2010) (noting "[w]e deferred action on this appeal," regarding similar
facts and issues to CLS, until the Supreme Court decided CLS).
237. See infra Part V.A.
238. Moore v. Watson, No. 09 C 701, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92578, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 7, 2010).
239. College Campus Press Act, 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 13/1 (2008).
240. See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 13/10; see also Moore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92578,
at *34.
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Circuit's holding in Hosty v. Carter.2 4 1 In Hosty, the Seventh Circuit
held that a university could regulate student speech in a subsidized
school newspaper as long as the regulations were "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 24 2  The Illinois legislature disagreed
with the court's granting universities censorship abilities and passed
legislation to protect student speech by requiring strict scrutiny
analysis.243 The court in Moore found that because the Illinois legislature
created a designated public forum for student speech when a university
permitted the publication of. student media, any restrictions on student
speech in campus newspapers were subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny.244 Moore demonstrates that carefully drafted legislation can
provide significant protection for students' rights in a university student-
group forum. The Equal Access Act245 provides an excellent model for
such legislation.
A. A Model: The Equal Access Act
In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act ("Act"). 246 The Act
prohibits public secondary schools that receive federal funding and that
create a limited open forum for students from denying equal access to the
forum on the basis of a student groups' religious, political, or
philosophical speech.247  A "limited open forum" under the Act is a
specially designed forum for student speech that is different from the
"limited public forum" of First Amendment jurisprudence, although they
bear important similarities.248 According to the Act, a school creates a
241. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); see Moore at *32. For a
discussion of Hosty v. Carter, see Michael 0. Finnigan, Jr., Comment and Casenote,
Extra! Extra! Read All About It! Censorship at State Universities: Hosty v. Carter, 74 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1477 (2006) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit's decision diminished the
effect of First Amendment rights on a university campus and provided a precedent for
restricting student speech at least in student publications).
242. Moore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92578, at *32 (quoting Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d
731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005)). This legitimate pedagogical concern standard is widely
applied in education law cases. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988) (holding First Amendment is not violated when educators exercise editorial
control over content of student speech if actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns); see also Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core:
A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 63 (2008)
(discussing the implications of this standard on speech restrictions in schools).
243. Id. at *34-35.
244. Moore, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92578, at *34.
245. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A §§ 4071-4074 (2006).
246. Id.
247. See id. § 4071(a).
248. See Duncan, supra note 5, at 116 ("The Equal Access Act creates a legislatively
defined, artificial construct."); Laycock, supra note 166, at 36 (noting that while the
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limited open forum when it provides an opportunity for noncurriculum-
related student groups to meet on campus during noninstructional time.24 9
Congress passed the Act because courts were ignoring and
misconstruing the Supreme Court's holding in Widmar.2 50 Thus, the Act
is based largely on the Court's reasoning in Widmar.25 1 As explained
252above, in Widmar the Court concluded that the University of Missouri
could not deny equal access to a religious student group even though the
University proffered a compelling state interest of maintaining separation
of church and state.2 53 The Court stated that incidental benefits enjoyed
by religious groups as a result of inclusion in a university's limited open
forum do not constitute an advancement of religion.254 This conclusion
is foundational to the Equal Access Act.2 55 In spite of the Court's clear
articulation in Widmar that religious worship and discussion are forms of
speech and association entitled to First Amendment protection even in
the nation's public schools,2 56 Congress believed it was necessary to pass
the Act to "address perceived widespread discrimination against religious
speech in public schools."2 57
Thus, the Act applies the Supreme Court's Widmar doctrine2 58 to
public high schools.2 59 The authors of the Act were primarily concerned
Act's definition "resembles" the judicial limited public forum, the Act "goes well beyond
the Supreme Court's cases").
249. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b). The Act's term "noncurriculum related student group"
has produced much debate and litigation as schools and student groups have attempted to
interpret the meaning of the term to manipulate the Act's applicability. See Laycock,
supra note 166, at 36-37. Parsing the meaning of this term, however, is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
250. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a public university must provide
equal access to religious student groups when the university has created a limited public
forum for student organizations).
251. See Rosemary C. Salomone, From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding Road of
First Amendment Analysis, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 302-03 (1991).
252. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Court's Widmar decision).
253. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71, 276 (1981).
254. See id. at 273 (noting that the University's claimed interest, while compelling,
was not "sufficiently 'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination" against the
student group's religious speech).
255. See Salomone, supra note 251, at 303.
256. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
257. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990)
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-710, at 4 (1984); See S. Rep. No. 98-357, at 10-11 (1984)).
258. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263.
259. See Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe term 'equal
access' means what the Supreme Court said in Widmar: religiously-oriented student
activities must be allowed under the same terms and conditions as other extracurricular
activities, once the secondary school has established a limited open forum."); Salomone,
supra note 251, at 296.
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with ending discrimination against religious student groups.26 0 However,
courts have broadly applied the Act, prohibiting public schools from
discriminating against student groups espousing religious, political, and
philosophical speech. 26 1 The Act contains a "policing provision"262 that
allows a school to deny access if a group's meeting "materially and
substantially interfere[s] with the orderly conduct of educational
activities."26 3 Thus, the Act provides schools some control over speech
in light of a school's pedagogical mission.264 In spite of numerous
attempts by secondary schools to limit the access of a variety of student
groups under the Act, the Supreme Court upheld the act as constitutional
in Board ofEduc. v. Mergens.265
In Mergens, the Court considered whether the Equal Access Act
prohibited a high school from denying a student religious club access to
school facilities.26 6 Students at Westside High School requested
permission to organize a student religious club.267 The school refused to
recognize the club because it believed that recognizing a religious club
would violate the Establishment Clause. 26 8 The students sued, alleging
that the school's denial of access violated the Equal Access Act.26 9
After performing a lengthy analysis of the Act, the Court
determined that the Act was both constitutional and applicable to the
260. See Susan Broberg, Note, Gay/Straight Alliances and Other Controversial
Student Groups: A New Test for the Equal Access Act, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 87, 90
(1999) (noting that while the clear intent of the Act was to protect religious speech, the
explicit language of the Act protects not only religious speech but also political,
philosophical, and other forms of speech). "[T]he very words that granted the right to
free expression of religion by voluntary student groups also grant similar access to
homosexual support groups, atheist clubs, and other 'fringe' groups." Id. at 89.
261. See Robert C. Boisvert, Jr., Of Equal Access and Trojan Horses, 3 LAW & INEQ.
373, 393 (1985) (noting that many legislators supported the Act "solely for its protection
of religious speech" even though the language of the Act seem to protect the rights of
nonconventional student groups as well, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazi Party, and
the Young Communist League).
262. Id. at 373, 393.
263. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c)(4).
264. See Michael P. Aaron, Note, The Equal Access Act: A Haven for High School
"Hate Groups"?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 614 (1985) (concluding that the Equal
Access Act's broad protection of student speech must be balanced with schools'
"educational role of imparting democratic values").
265. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding
that the Equal Access Act requires public high schools receiving federal funds to provide
equal access to school facilities to religious student groups where the school has created a
limited open forum).
266. Id. at 231.
267. Id at 232. The purpose of the student group was to allow students to study the
Bible, fellowship, and pray together. Id
268. Id. at 233.
269. Id.
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case before the Court. 27 0 Finding that Westside had created a limited
open forum pursuant to the Act, the Court held that Westside denied the
student group equal access in violation of the Act.27 1 Invoking the
Lemon Test,27 2 the Court found that the Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause.273 The Court asserted that a "crucial difference
[exists] between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."2 7 4  This same
reasoning could provide the framework for an Equal Access Act in
higher education.2 75 A Second Circuit case illustrates the possibility that
an Equal Access Act for higher education could counterbalance the
Court's holding in CLS.
B. A Case Study: Hsu v. Roslyn
The Second and Ninth Circuits disagree on whether the Equal
Access Act protects the right of a student group to exclude from
membership students who disagree with the group's message or
values.276 The Second Circuit, in Hsu v. Roslyn,277 applied the Supreme
Court's expressive association precedent, while the Ninth Circuit, in
Truth v. Kent,2 78 applied the Court's limited public forum analysis of
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality. 2 79 A brief overview of Hsu is
revealing.
270. Id. at 232-34.
271. Id. at 246-47.
272. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
273. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (noting that the Court's decision in Widmar is
controlling: "[w]e think the logic of Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access
Act").
274. Id. at 249.
275. See infra Part V.C.
276. Compare Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 855 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that the Equal Access Act protects the expressive activity of limiting a
student group's leadership to certain categories of people, if relevant to the group's
message or purpose), with Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir.) (noting
that the District's policies proscribing the student group's membership restrictions "do
not implicate any rights that Truth might enjoy under the Act"). Whether the Court's
CLS decision resolves this Circuit split remains to be seen. This Comment argues that the
Equal Access Act provides greater protection to student groups than the Court was
willing to recognize in CLS.
277. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 855 (2d Cir. 1996).
278. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9thCir. 2008).
279. See Neal H. Hutchens, Supreme Court to Consider Authority of Public Colleges
and Universities to Impose Nondiscrimination Policies on Student Groups in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, 254 ED. LAw REP. 477, 477-78, 482, n.39 (2010). Whether
the Court's holding in CLS extends to secondary schools remains to be seen. The Court
likely did not intend to extend its holding to secondary schools given its focus on
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In Hsu, the Second Circuit considered whether the Equal Access
Act required a school district, which had a broad nondiscrimination
policy, to recognize a religious student group that required its officers to
be Christians.280 Several students at Roslyn High School wanted to start
an after-school Bible Club.281' The students insisted that they be allowed
to restrict Club officers to professing Christians.2 82 The students argued
that requiring the Club to accept non-Christian officers would influence
the mission of the Club and interfere with the Club's speech at
283meetings. The school, however, refused to recognize the Club on the
basis that the Club's condition for officers violated the school's
nondiscrimination policy. 2 84  The Second Circuit concluded that the
Club's selective officer requirement was essential to the expressive
content of its meetings and to the preservation of its mission and identity
and thus was protected by the Equal Access Act.285
The court noted that the Act created a statutory free speech right for
students to form extracurricular groups that engage in religious,
philosophical, or political discourse at public secondary schools.28 6 The
Act, according to the court, was intended to require neutrality by schools
towards religious groups such that students "engaging in religious speech
have the same rights to associate together and speak as do students" who
meet for other reasons, such as to discuss politics or philosophy.287
However, the court noted, neither the legislative history nor the Supreme
Court had provided much guidance about whether the Act allowed after-
school religious groups to limit its leaders to a particular religion.288
Turning to the Supreme Court's expressive association cases, the
court found an integral connection between the Club's exclusionary
leadership policy and the Club's religious speech.289 Who was chosen to
universities and the lack of discussion about secondary schools or any applicable
precedents. See generally Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2992
(2010).
280. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 855 (2d Cir. 1996).
281. Id. at 848.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 851.
284. Id. at 848.
285. Id. at 848.
286. Id. at 854.
287. Id. (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 19,216 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton))
(emphasis in the original).
288. Id. at 855.
289. Id. at 857. The court relied on the reasoning in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), though the court noted that
Hurley was not controlling since the case before the court involved a federal statute-the
Equal Access Act. Id. at 856. Interestingly, when the Second Circuit decided Hsu, the
Supreme Court had not yet decided Dale. The court would likely have found Dale to be
particularly instructive.
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lead the Club would determine the religious content of the Club's
speech. 290 Refusing to separate the Club's leadership from the Club's
speech, the court concluded that the Equal Access Act protected the
Club's selective membership criteria.291 According to the court, the right
of expressive association was a necessary corollary of the Act's
protection of student speech.292 Thus, "the Act contains an implicit right
of expressive association when the goal of that association is to meet for
a purpose protected by the Act." 293
C. A Proposal: A Higher Education Equal Access Act
What the Equal Access Act provides for Establishment Clause
concerns in secondary school forums, an Equal Access Act for higher
education could provide for expressive association concerns in public
university student group forums. The Mergens case involved "the
intersection of two First Amendment guarantees-the Free Speech
Clause and the Establishment Clause."294 Similarly, cases like CLS
involve the intersection of student's First Amendment speech and
association rights and universities' nondiscrimination policies. 295
Secondary schools, like Westside in Mergens, wanted to remain neutral
with regard to religion. 2 96 To escape Establishment Clause violations,
secondary schools restricted the access of religious student groups to
student-group forums.297 Schools believed that being forced to include
religious student groups would confer the imprimatur of the school on
religion in violation of the Constitution.29 8 The adoption of the Equal
Access Act and resulting case law, however, demonstrates that including
religious student groups in a student-group forum does not require a
school to endorse religion. 2 99  Instead, the Act requires a school to
tolerate speech and expressive association. 300




294. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 263 (1990)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
295. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates
Status, Belief and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 709
(2011) (noting that at an institutional level, such as at universities, "the main clash
between ... equality and religious liberty is going to come when the state insists that
religious groups receiving state subsidies adhere to nondiscrimination rules. . .
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Thus, Congress or a state legislature could pass an act30' similar to
the Equal Access Act that regulates student-group forums at public
universities. 3 02 The act could mandate equal access-including the use
of university facilities, communications channels, and funding from the
student activity fee-for student groups regardless of the groups'
religious, political, or philosophical speech and associational activities.
Critical to the success of such an Act is the recognition that a
student group's exercise of speech or expressive association does not
bear the imprimatur of the university. The majority in Widmar, which
provided the framework for the Equal Access Act, concluded that "an
open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices."30 3 The Equal Access Act
codified this concept by distinguishing between student-initiated speech
and school-sponsored speech.30 4 Similarly, an equal access act for higher
education could create a statutory open forum whenever a university
opens a forum for student groups.
The act would need to be carefully drafted to protect both speech
and expressive association rights.305 For example, the act could forbid a
university from applying its nondiscrimination policy in a manner that
interferes with a religious, political, or philosophical group's expressive
association rights. The act could provide a policing provision
recognizing a university's right and responsibility to maintain order and
301. The constitutional authority for such an act is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The act could find legitimacy in a provision similar to that found in the Equal Access Act
applying the Act to secondary schools receiving federal funds.
302. Legislatures have often adopted measures intended to overcome unpopular
judicial decisions in order to provide greater freedoms under the First Amendment. For
example, the Supreme Court decided in Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that a
state could deny unemployment benefits to workers who were fired for using illegal
drugs for religious purposes. Id. The workers at issue were Native Americans who
smoked peyote, an illegal substance in Oregon, as part of their religious exercise. Id. at
874. The Court noted that an individual's religious beliefs do not excuse him from
obeying a valid law prohibiting conduct that the government is free to regulate. Id. at
878-79. The workers argued that the government must show a compelling state interest
before limiting their Free Exercise Rights. Id. at 883. The Court rejected this strict
scrutiny analysis as inapplicable to the case. Id. at 885. Congress responded to the
Court's decision by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2006). The Act required Courts to apply strict scrutiny in determining whether
a governmental entity violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id.; see generally Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
303. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
304. See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A § 4071 (2006).
305. See Truth v. Kent, 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Congress knows how to draft a
statute placing otherwise content-neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally
burden a First Amendment activity under the same judicial scrutiny as laws specifically
targeting the religious content of a group's expression.").
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control. However, the act could require the application of strict scrutiny
analysis to any restrictions imposed on access to a student-group forum.
The Court's student forum precedents306 impose an important
principle that the majority of the Court seems to have ignored: the
university campus is "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."' 307 This
principle requires courts to provide "vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms" on a university campus. 30 8  The Court has consistently
concluded that the nation's universities are bastions of free speech and
thought.309  Indeed, this lofty principle is foundational to many
universities' student forum programs. 310  The marketplace of ideas
concept should be embodied in a statutorily created student-group forum
doctrine for higher education. If university students are to fully engage
in free speech and thought, then they should have the full benefits of the
First Amendment. If universities wish to provide student groups with a
forum for speech under the guise of the First Amendment, then
universities must be held accountable to the boundaries that they have
set. "
VI. CONCLUSION
While the First Amendment protects a student's speech against a
university's viewpoint discrimination, the Court's decision in CLS grants
a university significant discretion restricting access to a student-group
forum at a public university. 312 Students do not have a constitutional
right to form student groups on a university campus. Thus, a university
may refuse to open a student-group forum on campus. However, once a
university has opened its campus to some student groups, creating a
limited public forum, the university should be required provide equal
access to all student groups.3 13  The Court's decision in CLS severely
restricts the access of students to student-group forums. An equal access
act for higher education could redefine the limits of a university's ability
to control student speech and association rights.
306. See supra Part III.
307. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
308. Id. at 180 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
309. See supra Part II.
310. See Luther supra note 187, at 686-91 (discussing the debate between benefits
and subsidies in the context of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez).
311. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988; Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
312. See Luther supra note 187, at 694-95.
313. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
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The Court's decision in CLS highlights an important debate that is
likely to occur in a variety of areas in First Amendment jurisprudence.
The debate involves the balancing of two important values: the freedoms
* * 314of speech and association versus nondiscrimination policies.
Foundational to the integrity of our system of higher education is
the recognition that our nation's universities are characterized by a
"tradition of thought and experiment" that depend on broad First
Amendment protections. University administrators should heed
Justice O'Connor's warning in Rosenberger against tampering with
students' First Amendment rights. 1 Suppressing the "free speech and
creative inquiry" of students will destroy the quality and creativity of the
nation's institutions of higher learning. "
314. See Thro, supra note 182, at 488 (noting that contrary to its prior precedents, the
Court "vindicated equality over the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, and
the freedom of civil associations" with the consequence that "such a coercive choice [is]
chilling for those who disagree with the prevailing social mood or government's current
position on an issue").
315. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836.
316. Id. at 836.
317. Id. at 836.
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